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Abstract
In this article we analyse the discourse of conserva-
tive commentators and journalists who produced critical 
items against 15-M mobilisations between 16 May and 30 
September 2011 in three newspapers: Abc, Libertad Digital 
and La Razón. The effort on the part of conservative jour-
nalists to deride and frame 15-M mobilisations as a threat 
should be considered repression; more precisely, these 
mechanisms should be seen as part of a broader strategy of 
repression of youth dissent, a strategy where conservative 
media outlets, through the securitisation of protesting, col-
laborate with conservative political parties, the police and 
some segments within the criminal legal system. The ex-
amination of the repressive behaviour of the Spanish media 
reveals a surprising parallelism between the present and 
a past that was thought to have been long overcome. In 
their fierce criticism of 15-M activism, Spanish conservative 
commentators have brought crowd psychology back to life 
– the popular theory that, until well into the twentieth cen-
tury, summarized certain nineteenth-century intellectual and
cultural elites’ fear of middle and working-class activism.
Keywords
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Youth Dissent. 
Resumen
En este artículo analizamos los discursos de periodistas 
y columnistas conservadores, críticos con el movimiento 
15M, que escribieron piezas en este sentido entre el 16 
de mayo y el 30 de septiembre de 2011. Estas piezas fue-
ron publicadas en tres periódicos diferentes: Abc, Libertad 
Digital y La razón. Defendemos que el esfuerzo de estos 
periodistas por denigrar al activismo ha de ser visto como 
una forma de represión de la protesta; la prensa, así, pue-
de desarrollar mecanismos discursivos hostiles que se in-
sertan en una estrategia más amplia de represión de la 
juventud. En esta estrategia, la prensa conservadora se 
alía con la policía y con partidos políticos también con-
servadores para ‘securitizar’ la protesta. El examen de la 
participación de la prensa española en la represión revela 
sorprendentes paralelismos con una visión del mundo que 
se creía ya muy superada: en particular, los periodistas y 
columnistas conservadores han resucitado la ‘psicología 
de las masas’, es decir, aquella popular teoría que resumía 
las ansiedades de la clase intelectual contra el activismo 
de la clase obrera.
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1. Introduction
Is repression a response to contentious mobilisa-
tion that is exclusively displayed by state authorities 
(e.g. police, courts, government officials)? Could 
civil society and other ‘private’ actors be part of the 
repressing efforts? And, how does it work? Is repres-
sion a modular strategy that is dependent on avail-
able opportunities? If so, what prepares the ground 
for repression? According to Charles Tilly (1978: 
100), repression is any behaviour, by any group, 
whose effect is to increase the cost of collective ac-
tion. Repression can be open or undercover. It can 
be exercised by coercion, but also by ‘channelling’, 
demotivating or simply though surveillance (Earl, 
2003). Repression will frequently include actions of 
harassment, intimidation and hindering of the pro-
test, which can lead to the arrest or incarceration of 
participants as a result of the active intervention of 
security forces; on other occasions, repression can 
simply materialise in a deterrent personal identity 
check or the issuing of an administrative warning 
against the protester. 
In this article we seek to advance on the theory 
of repression, by asking about the participation of 
non-state actors in the repression of political dissent. 
More specifically, we focus on the role of the media 
as a repressive agent by analysing the discourse of 
conservative commentators and journalists who pro-
duced critical items against 15-M mobilisations, be-
tween 16 May and 30 September 2011 in the follow-
ing newspapers: Abc, Libertad Digital and La Razón.1 
After identifying, coding and analysing more than 110 
pieces of different length, we claim that the conser-
vative press not only contributed to discrediting the 
protest – nothing new in the history of political activ-
ism – but also to the securitisation of 15-M activism. 
This crucially assisted the ongoing efforts by some 
state actors to issue legislation to further criminalize 
political protest. 
By addressing the role of the media in the repre-
sentation of dissent, we seek to engage with the calls 
for the consideration of repression as a site for alli-
ance-making between public and private actors (Earl, 
2011). The effort on the part of conservative journal-
ists to deride, and also to frame 15-M mobilisations 
as a threat to security, should be considered repres-
sion; more precisely, these mechanisms should be 
seen as part of a broader strategy of repression of 
youth dissent, a strategy where conservative media 
outlets collaborate with conservative political parties, 
the police and some segments within the criminal le-
gal system. Drawing on the insights of the literature 
on collective protest, and in particular on the work 
of Ferree (2005) on the repression of the women’s 
movement, we search for patterns of speech in the 
way social movements are represented in the main-
stream media. Rather than neutral actors in conten-
tious politics, the media can actively create oppor-
tunities for repression. In this light, one can make a 
connection between the efforts to represent mobili-
sation in a certain way, and public policies (security 
laws, reforms in Criminal Laws, and so on) that are 
enacted to regulate involvement in protest. 
We will point to the stark similarities of the ideas 
vested by Spanish conservative commentators with 
the old (and mostly presumed dead) arguments by 
the so-called ‘crowd psychologists’; namely, the 
theory that, until well into the twentieth century, 
summarized certain nineteenth-century intellectual 
and cultural elites’ fear of middle and working-class 
activism (Ginneken, 1992; Giner, 1979; Nye, 1975). 
Today, the ideas of authors such as Hippolyte Taine, 
Scipio Sighele, Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon 
are generally regarded as a biased and elitist at-
tempt at silencing and repressing social movements 
(Stott and Drury, 2017; García-García, 2016; 2015; 
Carey, 2009). Activism was reduced by those au-
thors to the category of irrational, barbaric, naïve 
and immature crowds (Stott and Drury, 2017; Reich-
er, 2008). Contemporary representations of activ-
ism as primitive and irrational, however, connect 
with those discredited ideas. Defying the perception 
that social movements have become a normal as-
pect of the political landscape of contemporary de-
mocracies, the representation of collective protest 
as a dangerous pathology invites thinking about the 
ideological underpinnings of repression, and also 
about the reasons why the contemporary conserva-
tive milieu remains deeply troubled with the political 
involvement of the masses. 
We will proceed as follows: after discussing our 
data and methods (section 2), we identify some gaps 
in the theory of repression (section 3); then, we will 
introduce 15-M mobilisations as the target of severe 
repression (section 4). We will present our analysis 
of the Spanish conservative media, describing the 
unfolding of the mechanisms of derision and securi-
tisation (section 5). In the final section we conclude. 
2. Data and Methods
The search for data started backwards; we de-
parted from the tightening of legal restrictions against 
protests in 2015. By tinkering with criminal and ad-
ministrative law, but foremost by passing a very re-
strictive security law that criminalized many forms of 
contentious mobilisation, the (conservative) Govern-
ment of the Popular Party framed social mobilisations 
as risks (Calvo and Portos, 2018; see also Fernán-
dez de Mosteyrín, 2012). So we searched for articles 
and opinion pieces published by national newspa-
pers about the 15-M mobilisations, to look for con-
cordances between governmental framing of these 
mobilisations as a social danger and representations 
of protests by the media. We were guided by Bennett 
and Segerberg’s ideas (2015: 369) about the mass 
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media as framing “stories according to cues from 
elites in power”. In this view, the media would often 
report on movements negatively, particularly if these 
movements were perceived, or could be presented 
as disruptive or violent. 
Data collection unfolded in two stages. In the first 
phase, the goal was to set out the broad editorial po-
sitions regarding 15-M mobilisations. We read and 
loosely coded around 250 pieces published by El País 
(social-democratic orientation), El Mundo (Centre-
rightist ideology), La Razón and Abc (conservative 
orientation), covering only a period of three weeks 
after 15 May 2011. We concluded that, despite some 
exceptions, El País followed a line that was support-
ive of the new social movement; the other newspa-
pers, including El Mundo (which publishes the ideas 
of journalists and columnists who have been very 
hostile to the 15-M mobilisations), displayed a much 
more critical view. Scholarly research on protest mo-
bilisation in Spain had already presented El País as 
the newspaper more sympathetic to the demands of 
protesters; this newspaper is also credited with offer-
ing the widest and most comprehensive coverage of 
protest events in the country (see, for instance, Cal-
vo, 2017). In relation to the conservative press, while 
some articles published by these newspapers had 
a positive tone, particularly in what regarded survey 
societal support for 15-M mobilisations (Sampedro 
and Lobera, 2014), a hostile disposition eventually 
became dominant, particularly as the ‘urban camps’ 
started to be perceived as disruptive of daily urban 
life in Madrid and Barcelona. The position of the con-
servative press reflected the view of conservative 
political parties, and particularly that of the Popular 
Party: for this political party, 15-M mobilisation rep-
resented the consolidation of a societal discourse 
against some of its core policy preferences, including 
social cuts, deregulation and privatisation. The 15-
M’s loud cry against corruption was also viewed by 
PP leaders as a menace. 
Considering that our aim was not to assess the 
attitudes of the media towards 15-M mobilisations in 
general, but, instead, to discuss the development of 
a ‘securitising’ discourse against those mobilisations, 
during the second stage we focused only on those 
newspapers where the majority of news items were 
overtly hostile towards the ‘indignados’; namely, La 
Razón and Abc. At the same time, we enlarged the 
temporal scope of the analysis. To get a more nu-
anced picture of the discourse projected by conser-
vative opinion makers, we expanded the analysis to 
include Libertad Digital (a digital outlet with a strong 
conservative orientation). We used digital engines 
(but also manual browsing) to retrieve news articles 
and opinion pieces that responded to a number of 
relevant search words (the most useful of which were 
‘protesta’, ‘15m’, ‘perroflautas’ - a despective term 
used to refer to a (young) person of anti-establish-
ment beliefs and alternative life-style-, ‘movilización’, 
but also ‘masas’ [masses] and ‘turbas’ [mobs]). In 
the end, we worked with a sample of 117 pieces, 
published in any of these three newspapers from 
16 May to 30 September 2011. The Appendix lists 
those pieces that were directly used in this article. 
We made theoretical informed decisions regarding 
coding during the second stage, particularly drawing 
on scholarship on crowd psychology to classify items 
according to the representations of mobilisation they 
displayed (‘crowds as madness’, ‘crowds as pathol-
ogy’, ‘crowds as immaturity’, and so on).
3. Securitisation and protest re-
pression 
Considerable progress has been made in the 
understanding of crucial aspects of repression. For 
example, we are now ready to differentiate the nu-
merous ways in which repression can be expressed, 
from extremism and mass arrest, to hyper-surveil-
lance or the strong increase of red tape requirements 
in the management of the right to association. The 
literature has also advanced in the understanding of 
variation in the intensity, specificity and severity of 
repression, variations that are associated with fac-
tors such as socio-economic status, the extent of 
media coverage, the country’s institutional structure, 
the different policing cultures, or the very strategies 
of the participants in collective action (Nordas and 
Davenport, 2013; Davenport, 2005; Wisler and Gi-
ugni, 1999). In relation to the policing of protesting, 
we work now from an interesting classification that 
emphasises the transition from a style of ‘negoti-
ated’ management of street protest, to a model that 
seeks its ‘strategic incapacitation’ (Gillham and No-
akes, 2007; see also Soule and Davenport, 2009). 
Recent analyses of policing discuss the development 
of new police tactics, the role of police surveillance 
and monitoring, and also variations in the targeting of 
specific forms of mobilisation by security forces (see, 
for instance, Pickard, 2018; Atak, 2017).
There is clear consensus in identifying the crimi-
nalisation of protest as central to any repressive 
strategy (Oliver, 2008: 12). The intervention of law 
in redefining protest seeks to consolidate repressive 
efforts, thus reinforcing control, punishment and sur-
veillance instruments while fostering a narration that 
condemns the social and political role of mobilisa-
tion. However, criminalisation is a concept that can 
be scaled; it draws on the combined effect of several 
instruments, which include both new criminal defini-
tions, and the redirection of existing administrative 
regulations with dissuasive effects. The literature re-
fers to this latter type of measures as ‘soft repression’ 
or ‘red tape repression’. We should not be misled by 
these labels. Many social movements in Spain and 
in other countries condemn what is perceived as a 
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gradual restriction against the development of citizen 
mobilisation that materializes in the form of these soft 
repression mechanisms. These include not only the 
very effective administrative fines and bureaucratic 
impediments to mobilisation (Comisión Legal Sol, 
2015; Oliver and Urda, 2015: 77-78); perhaps more 
daringly, soft repression relates also to the articula-
tion of a generalised environment that is hostile to 
activism, expressed in excessive surveillance and 
monitoring, the implementation of new techniques of 
‘crowd’ control, and also in the promotion of a culture 
of fear and insecurity (Brandariz, 2018). 
The sophistication of repressive mechanisms has 
opened new lines of research in repression litera-
ture. First, it seems increasingly difficult to identify 
repression as something that depends exclusively 
on ‘public actors’, meaning governments and state 
apparatuses (Earl 2011 and 2003). Ferree (2005) 
already warned of the need to extend observation 
to the behaviour of non-state actors that could, nev-
ertheless, share a certain repressive purpose with 
political authorities. What is the role, for example, 
of interest groups, other social movements or the 
media in the repression of social protest? In fact, 
Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) clearly established 
the role of counter-movements in raising the costs 
of mobilisation for those social movements they 
were opposed to. It seems more reasonable to 
understand repression as a strategy where gov-
ernments, the criminal justice system and security 
forces play a more or less active role and can forge 
alliances with different civil society actors (“private 
actors” in the words of Earl, 2011). The challenge, 
as noted by Jennifer Earl, is to identify the relative 
contribution of these private actors in each specific 
case (Earl, 2003). Secondly, further understanding 
of the long-haul factors that can generate opportu-
nities for repression is still required. It is surprising 
how little attention has been paid to the question 
of what the grounds for repression are and also to 
the mechanisms that facilitate the deployment of a 
repressive strategy. Is repression a gradual social 
and political process that requires preparatory ele-
ments? Indeed, research in other areas suggests 
that the answer is yes: there are significant links be-
tween the consolidation of certain discourses on a 
specific social group, ‘securitising’ discourses, and 
the subsequent development of repressive mecha-
nisms that elaborate on stigmatising and criminal-
ising the behaviour of groups and individuals. The 
work of Bourbeau (2011) is a case in point: his anal-
ysis shows the influence of media representations 
of immigration on decisions on policy in Canada 
and France. Together with content analysis of news 
items, Bourbeau drew on interviews with senior bu-
reaucrats and policy makers; these shed much light 
on the ways dominant public perceptions raise the 
costs of some policy alternatives, while making oth-
ers almost unavoidable. 
Building on these ideas, we address in this article 
the hardly explored issue of the media’s role in gen-
eral, and newspapers in particular, in the repression 
of social movements. Could newspapers be regard-
ed as repressive actors? Incapable of inflicting physi-
cal violence against protesters, could it be possible 
that the media created opportunities for the passing 
of repressive legislation and other repressive mea-
sures? We find the concept of securitisation particu-
larly fitting to address the role of the media in repres-
sion. The concept of securitisation, originally coined 
by scholarship in international relations, has quickly 
extended to other areas, including scholarship on 
migration and refugees, and also collective protest 
(Castelli and Morales, 2017; Dunn Cavelty and Jae-
ger, 2015). By securitising, powerful actors try to po-
sition a certain issue as a threat to society, always 
with the purpose of legitimising the subsequent “im-
plementation of emergency measures” (McDonald, 
2008: 567; Buzan et al, 1998). Securitisation fixes its 
attention on speech, proposing discursive formulas 
that catalogue a certain reality as a threat, placing 
emphasis on the risks (real or devised) associated to 
it. These formulas rest on the supposed legitimacy of 
those who suggest them, and who use their position 
to try to change collective perceptions, often in a very 
substantial way. Securitisation, it must be stressed, is 
narrowly linked to consequent punishment: it is an at-
tempt at modifying collective perception to justify pu-
nitive actions that will be proposed once the meaning 
of something has been successfully shifted. Special 
attention has been traditionally paid to securitising ef-
forts by governments and other state actors, such as 
security communities. Our argument, however, is that 
‘private actors’ can also contribute to securitisation. 
We will use the idea of securitisation at a very gen-
eral level (to refer broadly to the hostility of conserva-
tive opinion makers against 15-M mobilisations), but 
also at a more specific level, as one of the repressive 
mechanisms that we will identify later on in this ar-
ticle: namely, derision and securitisation itself. While 
these mechanisms share a general preoccupation 
with the moral underpinnings of protest and operate 
in a coordinated way towards the shaping of public 
perceptions, it is interesting to separate the emotion-
al connotations that the different mechanisms seek 
to activate: disgust and contempt in the former case, 
preoccupation and fear in the latter one. 
4. Repressing 15-M mobilisations 
Interest in repression seems especially justified 
in the light of the ongoing intensification of control, 
surveillance and repression against young people in 
particular, and against political dissent more gener-
ally. Both the spheres of youth sociology (Bessant 
and Grasso 2018; Pickard 2018; Bessant, 2017) and 
of critical criminology (for a review, see González and 
Maroto, 2018) emphasise the need to place the in-
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tense strengthening of state surveillance, control and 
sanction devices in a context of severe social frag-
mentation associated with the rearming of neoliberal 
policies. Youth dissent is targeted both at the individ-
ual and collective levels. In relation to the former, Ju-
dith Bessant (2017: 216), for instance, worries about 
state action against individual expressions of dissent 
that make use of satire, humour or on-line provoca-
tion: in her mind, the sanctioning of these practices 
reveals the readiness of liberal democracies to quash 
practices of communication and debate that might 
have a radical impact on the broadening of the public 
sphere. In relation to the latter, the criminalisation of 
specific forms of collective action can be read as a 
direct reaction of political authorities against a new 
disposition by young people to do away with passivity 
and become politically engaged.
Key to understanding the upsurge of repressive 
dynamics against dissent is the broadening of the 
protest repertoire favoured by the new expressions 
of contentious mobilisations, such as the 15-M or 
‘Occupy’ movements. Following a street march that 
was met with repressive actions by police, around 
130,000 people moved on to occupy Madrid’s Pla-
za Puerta del Sol, the heart of the Spanish capital, 
on 15 May 2011. Protesters contested the auster-
ity policies implemented in the wake of the Great 
Recession and called for real democracy. Thanks 
to social media platforms, information on the sit-in 
snowballed, and protest actions escalated. Over the 
subsequent days, camps — organised around open, 
popular, grassroots and non-hierarchical working 
groups — were replicated in almost 200 cities across 
the country and abroad, involving hundreds of thou-
sands of participants. 15-M triggered a broader cycle 
of collective action directed against austerity policies 
(Portos, 2016). Many of these activities defended 
specific sectors, such as housing and public services 
(e.g. the education and health systems). The overall 
wave of protest was unprecedented in the country’s 
recent history because of its mobilisation capacity, 
media salience and impact on the institutional and 
extra-conventional arenas (Romanos, 2016). It has 
been widely acknowledged that young people were 
overrepresented in these events: the vast majority 
of participants were 19-30 years old (Calvo, 2013; 
Likki, 2012). The indignant generation represented 
the young middle class with uncertain personal bi-
ographies and future perspectives. For many (espe-
cially young) people, the recession shock and the 
socioeconomic consequences that came about were 
a reality check; they made it clear that their hopes for 
social mobility were unrealistic.
15-M mobilisations centred on urban space as the 
main site for the expression of political demands, 
and also for the articulation of opposition against 
dominant practices in the field of politics and econ-
omy. There were encounters between police and 
protestors at different sites: from the squares dur-
ing the 15-M occupations (fighting police attempts 
to force activists out in Plaça Catalunya and Puerta 
del Sol), to attempts to surround the Congress (Ro-
dea el Congreso) in September 2012, mobilisations 
in solidarity with people about to be evicted from 
their homes, and the urban struggles of 2014. For 
example, clashes between activists/residents and 
the police took place in the underprivileged Gamonal 
neighbourhood (Burgos) in light of the local govern-
ment’s plans to transform a boulevard for pedestri-
ans into a parking area. Similarly, a violent outburst 
followed after the police forced the squatters out of 
the emblematic Can Vies social centre in Barcelona 
to demolish it. Attributing new meanings to squares, 
public parks, but also to the surroundings of public 
and private buildings became the signatory practic-
es of forms of contentious mobilisation where young 
people took a very prominent position.
Some aspects of the highly controversial Ley 
Orgánica 4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de protección 
de la seguridad ciudadana (‘Organic Law 4/2015, of 
30 March, on the Protection of Citizens’ Security’), 
known as Ley Mordaza (‘Gag Law’) seem to work 
as direct responses to the attention to space paid 
by 15-M activists. For instance, the law classifies as 
a very serious offence the “occupation of any prop-
erty, dwelling or building owned by other parties or 
the continued presence on such premises, in both 
cases against the will of the owner, tenant or holder 
of other rights on it, when they do not amount to a 
criminal offence”, or “the occupation of general utili-
ties involving infringement of the Law or against the 
decision taken pursuant to it by the competent au-
thority (art37.7, Citizens Security Law). Criminal law 
experts and social movement scholars have criti-
cised this legal change claiming that it contributes 
to criminalising political dissent (Calvo and Portos, 
2018; Avila, et al 2015). Amnesty International and 
other human rights organisations have described 
this law as a “threat to human rights”.2
As mentioned before, however, the strategy of re-
pression against 15-M mobilisations, by private as 
well as by public actors, includes mechanisms that 
are not strictly categorized as criminalisation. Not 
only the law, but also public perceptions are becom-
ing the site of overt confrontation between activists, 
government officials, political parties, the courts and, 
of course, the press. The handling by the Spanish 
government of the so-called 2012 “Valencian spring” 
(Primavera Valenciana) illustrates how both govern-
ment officials and police authorities accused activ-
ists of inciting fear and fostering crime. Scores of 
students occupied a high school to contest budget 
cuts in public education. Among other claims, they 
accused the Popular Party-led regional government 
in Valencia of denying students heating in the cold 
winter months. The police forced occupiers out of the 
school premises, using disproportionate violence. 
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goal towards silencing (discrediting and playing down 
the importance of associations, events, ideas and 
communities, whose prestige is undermined); and, 
secondly, securitisation, a mechanism not directly 
considered by Ferree, which, as mentioned above, 
seeks a conscious or unconscious identification of 
protest with threats to security. 
To begin with, the large number of instances 
where columnists explicitly refer to 15-M mobilisa-
tions as a mass, crowd, mob, rabble, horde or throng 
is in itself telling. To offer but a few examples: Juan 
Morote (2011) talks of the Puerta del Sol “mob”. An-
tonio Burgos (2011c), of “mobs”, “rabble” and “ma-
nipulated hordes”.6 Agapito Maestre, of the 15-M 
“rabble” (2011g) of “a small crowd that does harm, 
much harm” (2011b). Juan Manuel de Prada refers 
to the “idiotized masses (indignant!)” (2011e), to a 
people “reduced to a shapeless mass” (2011b). Jon 
Juaristi, to “anti-democratic mass frenzy” (2011a). 
Tomás Cuesta refers to the “flooding of the streets”, 
the “masses” (2011c), and “the screaming mob” 
(2011a). Ignacio Sánchez Cámara, on his part, men-
tions the “mass-man”: “…can’t we see them shout-
ing everywhere?... violence becomes the premium 
ratio… The form of intervention in politics of the 
mass-man is direct action” (2011). 
Columnists not only use the notion of mob, 
crowd, rabble or mass; they also clearly and un-
equivocally refer to old crowd intellectuals and 
theoreticians, from Tocqueville to Canetti, from 
Spengler to Ortega y Gasset. Thus, in the men-
tioned article by Sánchez Cámara, he states that 
Ortega’s diagnosis of mass rebellions is still valid to 
explain the “violence” and “barbarism” that afflicts 
European societies (“what Ortega predicted has, to 
a large extent, become true”). José María Carrascal 
(2011b) cites another critic of the mass society and 
the decline of the West: Oswald Spengler. Similarly, 
in the context of new mobilisations, Ángela Vallvey 
(2011) expresses her distrust of all revolutionary 
social change processes and suggests reading 
Alexis and Tocqueville. And Mercedes Monmany 
warns against the dangers of real democracy, quot-
ing Elias Canetti (Crowds and Power) to evoke the 
rise of mass movements in interwar Europe: 
 “… the night of the 27 and 28 February 1933, four 
weeks after Adolf Hitler’s appointment as Reich 
Chancellor, the Parliament building, the Reichstag, 
burned… The political rights guaranteed by Wei-
mar’s Constitution were quickly suspended, and the 
most basic civil guarantees were revoked. The rest 
is already known. The individual had ceased to exist, 
from then on only the mass existed, as Canetti also 
announced in his book Crowds and Power” (2011).7
Derision (and Silencing)
Paraphrasing Barrows, derision as a rhetoric de-
vice could be defined as an attempt to “rationalise 
According to The Sunday Morning Herald, “riot cops 
on Monday charged and beat demonstrators, leaving 
several bleeding and arresting dozens of people in-
cluding several minors”, and then conflict escalated.3 
The head of police forces in Valencia used military 
language to explain the police’s brutal approach: 
according to him, the police “responds when it is at-
tacked”. Similarly, he declined to give information on 
the number of policemen deployed, “as one does 
not give out information to the enemy”.4 But law of-
ficials can also play a part in securitisation (Camps 
and García, 2015: 62): district attorneys (fiscales) 
in Spain issued petitions of pre-trial imprisonment 
for activists detained by police, something generally 
perceived to be a very harsh choice. District attor-
neys have also (unsuccessfully) requested perma-
nent bans on future demonstrations, together with 
extraordinarily harsh prison sentences. The “Alfon 
case” has been particularly notorious in the Spanish 
context. A twenty-one-year-old man was put in jail 
with no trial for 56 days and subjected to a special 
juridical regime that is supposed to survey potentially 
troublesome criminals.5 Confronted with a process 
allegedly ridden with irregular procedures, Alfon was 
eventually put on trial due to charges of alleged il-
legal possession of explosives during the November 
2012 general strike, and was sentenced to jail for four 
years in 2015 (Comisión Legal Sol, 2015: p.83-84).
5. The press, repression and the 
fear of crowds
The press can play an active part in framing the 
dominant discourses on certain forms of activism. 
Social movement scholarship is clear in seeing the 
media as a crucial actor in the fortunes of most social 
movements (Koopmans, 2004). Newspapers, radio 
and TV stations and digital news outlets can become 
key actors in the ‘virtual battles’ involving the state, 
social movements and other political and social ac-
tors (Davenport, 2005). A sympathetic and abundant 
coverage of protest events is what most movements 
wish for; most campaigners are well-aware of the 
need for such type of coverage to succeed in their 
mobilisation efforts, and also to be able to establish 
firm alliances with large segments of the public. Marx 
Ferree (2005), when addressing the feminist move-
ment and its relationship with the press, proposed 
a classification of the different critical pieces written 
against social movements according to the various 
(repressive) mechanisms of communication they 
used. Ferree’s analysis paid particular attention to 
the issue of derision, a complex rhetorical device that 
combines insult with constant references to infantili-
sation, recklessness or absence of a clear direction. 
Applying Ferree’s ideas to the issue at stake, we can 
define two main discursive mechanisms: the already 
described derision, a mechanism that we argue in-
corporates not only offensive practices, but also a 
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the refusal to listen to dissident voices, a deep-rooted 
reluctance to assess proletarian movements in their 
own terms” (Barrows, 1981: 191). Social movements 
have often been subject to mockery and discredit-
ing by opinion-makers and political elites alike. To 
provide an example: on May 2017 it was known that 
Susana Díaz, from the Socialist Party PSOE and 
head of the regional government in Andalucía, had 
referred to the ‘indignados’ as capricious and spoiled 
youngsters, who protested solely on the grounds 
of the difficulties they were going to face to ‘buy a 
house by the seaside’.8 Back to 2011, most commen-
tators condemned 15-M activism as the product of 
ignorance, recklessness and impulsivity, when not 
directly labelling protesters as uncivilized and imma-
ture creatures (and also, as will later be seen, com-
paring them with barbarians and savages). In this 
reading, protesters could be seen as individuals who 
would have been almost effortlessly manipulated by 
an elite. “Sincerely, Democracia Real YA are fools” 
–claimed Jorge Valín (2011). “The camp mobilisa-
tion has been abducted by the Marxist left” –declared 
Yulen Rossy and Miryam Lindberg (2011). Hermann 
Tertsch (2011a), José Raga (2011) and Jorge Vilches 
(2011b) expressed similar views. 15-M commenta-
tors noted how a minority of politicians and agitators 
would be manipulating the movement’s drive at their 
own convenience. Antonio Burgos speaks of a so-
cialist elite that resorts to agitprop “to use and manip-
ulate the hordes” (2011c). Tomás Cuesta (2011b) and 
Alfonso Merlos (2011) blame socialists for the “intoxi-
cation and manipulation” of the masses. “These agi-
tators –said Merlos- are the younger brothers of the 
others [of 2004], messing with Twitter, playing around 
on Facebook, alike in illiteracy and group drinking, 
but with the unflagging will of harvesting a new suc-
cess with the old formula of mass agitation”. Numer-
ous commentators placed all responsibility on Pérez-
Rubalcaba, a politician who –as expressed by García 
Domínguez (2011b)- “flatters the crowd” and satisfies 
“its instincts”. And who, in the words of Pablo Molina, 
“is always several bodies ahead of the pack” (2011).9
Columnists stressed infantilisation. Thus, there 
was talk of “kids”, “cubs”, “spoiled child-citizens”, 
“little ones”, “babies”, “punks”, “youth”, “unruly kin-
dergarteners” or “tots throwing a tantrum” (Molina, 
2011; Tertsch, 2011b; Monmany, 2011; Burgos, 
2011a; Martínez-Abarca, 2011a; 2011b; Ruiz-Quin-
tano, 2011d; Cuesta, 2011a; De Prada, 2011f; 
2011a; López Schlichting, 2011). Luis Ventoso re-
ferred to “the square’s protest spree” (2011); Cristina 
Losada, to “the camp, happening or great drinking 
get-together based at the Puerta del Sol” (2011b). 
There were also countless references to the drinking 
of alcohol and the use of drugs:
 “… ‘Spanish Revolution’? Wow, mate! A shot of hallu-
cinogenic sangría gets you high (or brings you down) 
to a far lesser degree than that utopic substance that 
is traded in TV shopping. Because, behold how the 
indignant herd hits you suddenly with no blows in-
volved, the screaming mob, the surfers of chaos, the 
unruly kindergarteners, keen on sitting on squares 
after a tantrum that has gone unpunished, in the 
martyrdom of rebellious humanity. Slow down, Ben-
Hur… The Puerta del Sol is not the Tahrir Square… 
The indignation rash that we are suffering is closer to 
a camp fire than to the zero-mile of the new era… Yet, 
in Tahrir there is blood spill and here, luckily, what 
flows in abundance is beer” (Cuesta, 2011a).
By discrediting the protesters as underage or com-
pletely immature, conservative critics contributed to 
silence the reasons or political arguments used by 
the citizens to justify their protest. The masses are 
immature and childish, capricious and hedonistic, 
always irresponsible (García-Domínguez, 2011a). 
This is why they are easy to mobilise and manipulate 
through social networks such as Facebook or Twit-
ter. “The unfathomable wave of foolishness that has 
come upon us” –said José María Marco- “is related to 
the famous social networks” (2011; see also Ferrari, 
2011; Losada, 2011a). According to certain authors, 
the success of 15-M summons was mostly due to the 
new communication forms and channels rather than 
to the ideological content of the movement’s mes-
sages and demands. The movement’s extravagant 
appeal is related to its success in terms of media 
coverage, claimed Edurne Uriarte:
“What has been important is the movement’s staging 
and aesthetics, not what it demands. Young people, 
the hippy look, the square, social networks, the me-
dium is the message. And the anti-capitalist, populist 
and demagogic contents matter little. In fact… hardly 
anyone is fully aware of them” (Uriarte, 2011). 
In sum, columnists associate the behaviour of the 
crowd at Sol with the irrationality of impulses, instincts 
and urges. Sometimes, this same view is expressed 
by journalists who show greater understanding and 
closeness to 15-M protesters’ position. Since history 
–claims José Luis Alvite- has more than enough “for-
midable flashes of almost youthful euphoria where 
instinct was stronger than reason” (2011a). Or, as 
stated at another time:
“Every time people gather in a crowd, something 
important happens: a revolution, Olympic Games, a 
war… It is clear that, when summoned with an ideo-
logical motivation, it becomes that which conserva-
tives, always fearful, call ‘a horde’, meaning a mob 
possessed with the fury of a hazy idea that the in-
stigators of the attack sometimes combine with in-
cendiary chants and a plentiful supply of cheap gin…
people organize themselves around an idea that has 
its effect precisely if it is not discussed… impulse is 
stronger than reason” (Alvite 2011b).
The aforementioned way of framing protest bears 
remarkable similarities with the ideas first put forth by 
crowd psychologists (Le Bon, 1896; Sighele, 1892; 
Tarde, 1890). In the late nineteenth century, many 
western scholars still had faith in the laws of prog-
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ress and evolution. According to one of the most 
well-known interpretations of the time, progress or 
the development of society was to inevitably go from 
a simple to a complex order, from a socially homo-
geneous organisation to a heterogeneous one, and 
from the undifferentiated and incoherent matter of 
past times to the triumph of differentiation and indi-
vidualism, a stage where people were called to be-
have like self-aware beings, free and rational. The 
optimistic and self-satisfied account of early evolu-
tionism had begun to take shape with psychologists’ 
more negative readings and views of crowds and 
masses. Thus, French authors Hippolyte Taine and 
Gustave Le Bon believed that the troubling presence 
of the new working-class masses that inhabited ma-
jor urban centres also posed an alternative scenario 
for degeneration or evolutive regression, the dissolu-
tion of the modern and civilized society into a crowd 
with no hierarchy or moral standards (McClelland, 
1989; Pick, 1989). The individuals that made up the 
mass were characterised by their irrationality, reck-
lessness, impressionability and brutality. They were 
presented as underdeveloped beings (the savage), 
lacking in judgement and maturity (the child, the mad-
man), easy to manipulate (controlled, hypnotised) by 
a more rational, mature and developed minority or 
elite. Insisting on stigmatisation, those that are part 
of the mass are labelled as “primitive”, barbarians 
that have “sneaked about the old backstage that is 
civilisation” –as stated years later by the philosopher 
Ortega y Gasset ([1983] 1929: 92). 
The likening of the crowd with apes, worms or 
germs gave strength to the assumption of evolutive 
regression and stripped the individuals that made up 
the crowd of all human status (Carey, 2009). These 
authors held conservative, if not openly reactionary, 
views. Taine and Le Bon’s conception of crowd con-
veyed, above all, the meaning of a temporary human 
group -crowd, mob- such as the one involved in the 
insurrectional phenomena of French modern history 
(French Revolution, Revolutions of 1848, Paris Com-
mune, etc.). Thus, the most repeated image of the 
masses involved -for them- the presence of a crowd 
or mob of individuals gathered on a European city’s 
streets or squares, committing countless outrages 
and massacres. By reducing the political voice of 
new crowds or urban masses to a status of irrational-
ity, madness and/or underage concerns, the potential 
reasons or arguments that could justify the protest 
are brushed aside (Barrows, 1981).
Securitisation: The threat that feeds on sickness
Crowd psychologists referred to the masses as 
groups of individuals afflicted by some sort of men-
tal disorder, such as hysteria; alternatively, masses 
were represented as marginal minorities that share a 
deficient and unhealthy constitution or nature: com-
mon offenders and criminals, vagabonds, beggars, 
alcoholics, prostitutes, dissolute individuals… Re-
calling the words of Taine, who, in his account of the 
French revolutionary crowds, mentioned the throng 
of wretches and sinister characters who roamed the 
capital’s streets and squares during the days of the 
revolt: “Thieves, galley slaves, all sorts of outlaws 
are those that would be at the vanguard of the insur-
rections… Society’s slime surfaces in all revolutions. 
Never before seen; like forest badgers or sewer rats, 
they had been hiding in their dens. They pour out in 
flocks and, all of a sudden, the characters that can be 
seen in Paris!” ([1876] 1996: 168). 
Spanish conservative article writers used a very 
similar rhetoric to describe a political phenomenon 
that is far from the working-class mobilisations of the 
nineteenth century in its social composition, forms of 
organising and type of leadership. They linked stig-
ma to danger, sickness to risk: these members of the 
conservative milieu employed a wealth of stigmatis-
ing metaphors that associated the crowd’s behaviour 
with that of criminals, barbarians, lunatics and/or 
beasts. This, of course, aimed at creating fear. 
“Perhaps the first thing that should be acknowledged 
is that there is currently a European barbarism, and 
that barbarians do not await us at the other side of 
our borders… The new man that prevails, the re-
bellious mass-man, denies the principles of culture, 
which are, above all, demands, requirements and 
rules” (Sánchez-Cámara, 2011). 
Commentators on the 15-M mobilisations set indi-
vidual reason against the crowd’s instincts. The idea 
that masses will listen to “concepts” rather than to 
“emotions” must be dismissed –according to Mer-
cedes Monmany (2011) and José Carlos Rodríguez 
(2011b). The unleashing of instincts and passion –
says Miquel Porta Perales (2011)- is at the root of 
the dangers that we are now threatened by, a key 
idea to understanding the relationship between activ-
ism and security. 15-M is a primitive movement, very 
primary, “a sentimental, visceral reaction, but never a 
concept, a reason” –claims Maestre (2011e; 2011a). 
Some go beyond this and unearth the old hypothesis 
that contagion or suggestion is one of the fundamen-
tal causes of mass movements. “…a lie that is re-
peated a thousand times can become truth, especial-
ly among suggestible people” –says Juan Manuel de 
Prada (2011d; see also De Prada, 2011c). “No matter 
how painful, it must not be ruled out that the camp 
is partly the fruit of contagion [by the Arab Spring]” - 
writes Emilio Campmany (2011).
It, therefore, comes as no surprise that, along-
side stigmatisation, commentators developed the 
idea of danger, of threat: activism was portrayed as 
a source of insecurity. This notion is, as mentioned 
above, key to the construction of the concept of se-
curitisation: the redefinition of a reality into a threat 
with the aim of laying the foundations for the subse-
quent development of repressive mechanisms. The 
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idea of barbarity is often linked to the 15-M move-
ment’s noncompliance with law, occupation of public 
spaces and paying no heed to electoral regulations, 
when not directly referring to episodes of violence. 
“I’m sorry for the pilgrims that have suffered the rab-
ble’s fits of rage –says Alfonso Ussía-… that clue-
less and wrathful scum … [those at Sol] act from the 
greatest ordinariness. What is difficult is to respond 
to the barbarity…” (Ussía, 2011; see also Del Val, 
2011; Maestre, 2011d).
A social movement’s public image is exposed to 
the results of virtual battles: public views lean in one 
or another direction inasmuch as arguments gather 
and build a coherent and comprehensible account. 
The identification of 15-M mobilisations as a threat 
draws upon, as we are describing, a systematic dis-
crediting of a certain activism that is labelled as irra-
tional and violent; the suggestion is that these forms 
of participation are a security problem. In this regard, 
alongside the barbarian or the savage, the likening of 
the mass with the behaviour of animals is also a very 
common rhetoric device. “…some crow-like species, 
a small group of carrion birds… swarm freely around 
the Puerta del Sol” –states Juan Morote (2011). As 
already done by Le Bon in his denunciation of so-
cialism, the thought leaders of our time use animal 
metaphors to build an account that is critical of the 
15-M -the movement of the perroflautas. Thus, there 
is further writing about “hordes” and “herds”, “vi-
ruses” and “germs”, “dogs” and “packs”, or “crows” 
and “worms” (Alvite, 2011b; Juaristi, 2011b; Burgos, 
2011b; Carrascal, 2011a; Dietz, 2011 a, 2011b; Mer-
los, 2011; Molina, 2011; Morote, 2011; Ruiz Quinta-
no, 2011a). As already stated by the author of Mein 
Kampf, claims Mercedes Monmany (2011), masses 
know and understand nothing: “Amidst the crowd, 
the individual is ‘like an insignificant worm’ that only 
feels the energy of 200,000 people struggling togeth-
er for an ideal, which he himself fails to understand 
and which has no why or wherefore”. According to 
the commentators of Die Zeit -says Tomás Cuesta 
approvingly (2011b)- “the street rash that are our ‘in-
dignados’ is, really a folkloric reflection, lifeless and 
unstructured, of the emotional scabies outbreak that 
has put half of Europe in democratic quarantine… No 
matter how much it may upset those who insist on 
masking the (brown) plague with incense, the argu-
ment collar of bloodhounds is the same that is worn 
today by the perroflautas”. 
Partial neglect of the content of political grievances 
led a small number of authors to establish compari-
sons between ideology, religion and myth. “The myth 
of the indignant people, rising spontaneously against 
the system in the name of ‘social justice’ –says Jorge 
Vilches (2011a)- has haunted socialism in the form 
of that Marxist ghost that has been roaming Europe”. 
Like the catholic congregation, states Bernd Dietz, 
15-M protesters have their own “mythologies”, those 
of communism – “the most enslaving, deranged and 
genocidal to see the light of day on the face of the 
Earth” (2011b). This is another rhetoric device used 
frequently by Le Bon and the rest of crowd psycholo-
gists in the repression of socialism. It surfaces again 
–though less often- in the discursive strategies of 
15-M censors. More than issues and concepts of a 
profane and ideological nature, the citizens of the 
Puerta del Sol gathered around a “myth” or “supersti-
tion” that ultimately refers to the prevalence of erro-
neous ideas and prejudices that are deeply rooted in 
the popular mind (Dietz, 2011a).
Finally, who are the individuals that participate in 
the masses or crowds that conservative columnists 
are so worried about? As seen, Taine, Sighele and 
Le Bon often spoke of masses made up of suspicious 
looking individuals, thugs and criminals, marginal 
individuals, the underclass of the “rabble”. We find 
human types of similar social extraction and ques-
tionable morals in current descriptions of collective 
behaviour. Amando de Miguel talks of “shabbiness” 
(2011); Francisco Reyero, of “troublemakers, jailbirds 
and bums” (2011). José Antonio Martínez-Abarca re-
fers to the “underworld” and the “rubbishy” (2011d); 
to individuals who “have no love for work or order” 
(2011e). Gloria Lomana speaks of “the worst mob still 
camped at the Puerta del Sol” (2011); Alfonso Ussía 
(2011), Agapito Maestre (2011g) and Antonio Bur-
gos (2011c) of the 15-M “rabble”, “scum” or “riff-raff”. 
Thus, indignados are often portrayed as marginal in-
dividuals and criminals. In the words of Serafín Fan-
jul, they are “gangs of slackers and freeloaders lying 
about on the floor, who yell and harass the city coun-
cillors of the PP” (2011). 
Nonetheless, these are not the only human types 
that feature in descriptions of masses. Once more, 
as with Taine and Le Bon’s rhetoric, the very concept 
of mass(es) also refers to a majority, or to society as 
a whole. Thus, 15-M detractors seem to observe at 
other times that the mass is everywhere (or that we 
are all part of the mass). “… the conspiring trouble-
making of the indignant… –says Ignacio Ruiz Quin-
tano- is the dominant culture in Spain” (2011d). We 
are before a “childish indignation”, says José Carlos 
Rodríguez, “characteristic of an infantilized society” 
(2011a; see also Albiac 2011). The people, the citi-
zens, warns José Manuel de Prada, have been re-
duced in their entirety to a “shapeless mass” (2011b). 
“Spain is perhaps the mass-man’s paradise”, writes 
Ignacio Sánchez Cámara (2011). Using admonishing 
and prophetic language, masses are often described 
as a ubiquitous danger or a looming threat through-
out Spain, the West or humanity as a whole: 
“…What Ortega predicted, has to a large extent, 
become true… ‘this new barbarian is an automatic 
product of modern civilisation’. It is not a haphazard 
and fortuitous disease. Nineteenth century Europe 
was headed resolutely towards it. That’s why there 
is room for talk about a ‘dissatisfied little rich boy’, a 
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spoilt child who, after squandering the inherited trea-
sure of culture, is now broke… Spain is perhaps the 
mass-man’s paradise, but the phenomenon is Eu-
ropean and, probably western… the crisis is deep, 
abyssal” (Sánchez Cámara, 2011).
“… the Spanish 15-M, ideologically inscrutable if we 
consider its manifestos, involves a sense of trouble, 
defiance, against authority. It is embedded in the 
mosaic that, on the western world’s floor, is crum-
bling and bringing down with it centuries of culture 
and civilisation that have marked… History’s prog-
ress… We could be facing the end of an era… or… 
the decadence of a time when authority was the 
ongoing catalyst of coexistence and development” 
(Martín Ferrand, 2011; see also Robles, 2011; and 
Carrascal, 2011b; 2011c).
6. Conclusions
The recuperation of old ideas about crowds and 
multitudes might be a common trend across different 
experiences of repression, and not simply a case-
specific phenomenon. Atak’s work (2017) on the val-
ues and discourse of police forces in Turkey find stark 
similarities with the data discussed in this article, in 
terms of the presence of the ideas of crowd psychol-
ogy in the underlying values guiding responses to 
dissent, and also in relation to the speech practices 
deployed to justify police brutality. Le Bon’s imprint, it 
seems, lives on in today’s political discourse. 
Crowd psychology theories fell out of academic fa-
vour quite some time ago, their ideas widely regard-
ed as biased and ideological. Back in the late 19th 
century, the identification of the people as irrational 
mobs worked in the direction of eroding the meaning 
and legitimacy of the new claims for civil and political 
rights (Drury y Stott, 2011; Reicher 2008; Barrows, 
1981; Apfelbaum y McGuire, 1986). In Reicher’s 
words, if crowds articulated grievances and alterna-
tive visions of society, Le Bonian psychology silenced 
that voice, legitimating repression: “crowds, having 
no reason, cannot be reasoned with” (Reicher, 2008: 
187). Crowd psychologist theories might have lost 
prestige within academic circles; the influence of their 
ideas, however, has remained. The thesis that mass 
behaviour represents an example of collective irra-
tionally found new momentum during the late 1950s 
and 1960s. As it has been very well explained by 
scholarly work on the civil rights and anti-war move-
ments of those years, security forces in general, and 
metropolitan/local police forces in particular, justified 
brutal forms of repression against civil activists on 
the grounds of the irrationality of collective protest. 
Rights were a site for social and political contesta-
tion, and security communities worked under the as-
sumption that the protection of societal order was at 
odds with the acceptance of ‘unruly’ expressions of 
dissent and resistance.
Protest, of course, is now generally accepted as 
a recurrent feature of the political landscape of rep-
resentative democracies, particularly when it comes 
to the political participation of young people (García 
Albacete, 2014). Regardless of the fact that disrup-
tive forms of protesting have always infuriated some 
social groups, it is safe to say that social move-
ments have gained a new status as polity members; 
they are widely regarded as recurrent elements of 
the political system, with a say in the definition of 
political problems. Would this mean that the time for 
Le Bonian ideas on multitudes and crowds has defi-
nitely expired? Apparently not. As we have shown 
in this article, conservative journalists and opinion 
makers in Spain displayed a number of discoursive 
mechanisms against 15-M mobilisations. Protest-
ers were derided, silenced, stigmatised and, above 
all, presented as a security threat. The Spanish 
conservative media participated in a virtual war of 
meaning, where ideas of democratic regeneration 
and civic inclusion were contested through appeals 
to danger, insecurity and risk. Such a response, we 
would like to stress, not only coincided in time with 
acts of speech by Government and Law officials 
who also framed 15-M mobilisations as a threat; 
they facilitated the subsequent criminalisation of 
some forms of protest through the passing of a very 
tough security law.
The so-called “Gag Law” was not only contested 
in the domestic arena, but it was also controversial 
in the international sphere. A number of anti-Gag 
Law protest campaigns unfolded across the country, 
which combined traditional and innovative repertoires 
of action (e.g., petitioning, marching — including the 
world’s first ever demonstration by holograms10 —, 
theatrical performances). The legislative change 
was enacted in part as a response to the preceding 
cycle of popular contestation against austerity poli-
cies, where the (often precarious) youth was over-
represented. In order to place popular dissent under 
control, authorities deployed a mix of coercive forms 
of repression, which evolved towards subtler, softer 
tactics (including penalties and identity checks) and 
surveillance activities. This trend, of course, does not 
only represent a narrowing of the structure of politi-
cal opportunities for mobilisation; more generally, it 
points at a profound transformation in the cultural 
dispositions of elites and political authorities against 
the acceptance of the democratic practices that best 
represent the political orientation of young people in 
contemporary representative democracies. 
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Notes
1. 15-M stands for 15th of May, and it has become the 
most common way of referring to the social movement 
born amidst the calls for democratic generation back in 
2011. Acknowledging the ongoing debate as to wheth-
er or not 15-M was a social movement in the traditional 
sense of the concept, we will refer to it as a site for 
mobilisation and contentious politics.
2. See https://www.es.amnesty.org/actua/acciones/
espana-ley-seguridad-ciudadana-oct14/; accessed on 
16 March 2017.
3. See http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/
spain-budget-cuts-spawn-valencian-spring-protests-
20120221-1tme3.html; accessed 21 January 2017.
4. See http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2012/02/20/valen-
cia/1329764951_838007.html; accessed 5 March 
2017.
5. See http://www.eldiario.es/politica/alfon-
FIES_0_78392640.html; accessed 12 February 2017.
6. Information on these articles is included as an Appen-
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